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It is axiomatic that flying in today’s post-September 11th world is a hassle. Between
airlines suggesting that passengers arrive at the airport anywhere from 60 minutes to 120 minutes
before flight time1 and security checkpoints that can be anything but user-friendly, flying today
is turning author Greg Anderson’s idea, “[f]ocus on the journey, not the destination,”2 into
something of a misnomer. Imagine then, in addition to check-in counters, long lines at security
checkpoints, great distances between terminals and boarding gates, crowded airports, and less
than favorable flying conditions, having to navigate the world of air travel with a disability.
Depending on the nature and extent of the disability, accommodations needed to help the
disabled passenger could be as simple as extra time on the jet bridge or a wheelchair through the
airport. But, as will be discussed in this paper, these small requests might subject a disabled
individual to discrimination, mental and potential physical injury, not to mention precious lost
time, lengthy delays, unnecessary costs, and other unpleasantness that come with embarking into
today’s world of transportation by air. As former Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, “[d]elays may
be particularly costly in [air travel], as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours
worth of subsequent inconvenience.”3
This paper will focus on the statutory protections for travelers with disabling conditions,
specifically the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA),4 as well as the remedies, or lack thereof, which
are afforded to passengers when incidents of discrimination occur. In addition, the history of the
ACAA and the case law relating to it will be discussed. Throughout the paper, the interplay of
the ACAA with other disability and civil rights laws, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)5 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19736 will be addressed. Furthermore, this
paper will reveal some of the challenges faced by a family flying with a child with a serious
disability. Finally, changes will be suggested to existing laws and airline employee practices in
order to bring the ACAA in line with its original spirit and purpose, the protection of the civil
rights of air travelers with disabilities.
Permeating this discussion will be a focus on a specific subset of the flying population: a
family that is traveling with a child with a disability. For purposes of this paper, I have created a
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hypothetical nuclear family consisting of a mother, father, and two children, one of whom (called
“Jack”) has a serious disabling condition which affects one or more major life activities. The
obstacles that both Jack and his family face in using our nation’s network of airports and flights
and what tools Jack and his family might have at their disposal to deal with discrimination as
they “fly the friendly skies”7 will be discussed.
To help illustrate the issues faced by Jack and his family, two situations will be analyzed
to demonstrate common problems that families flying with children with disabilities might face
in the course of travel. In scenario A, Jack is flying alone and the airline is requiring that he fly
with an escort even though Jack has the ability to care for himself on board the aircraft. In
scenario B, Jack has caused some sort of ruckus on board the aircraft due to his disability. The
Captain feels uncomfortable flying the plane with Jack’s behavior, and the entire family is
removed from the flight.
I.

ACAA: A BRIEF PRIMER
A. The History Preceding the ACAA

The ACAA can trace its roots back to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.8 Section 404 of
the Act required air carriers to “provide safe and adequate service . . .” and forbade carriers from
“[subjecting] any particular person to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or any disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.”9 In 1973, the Rehabilitation Act was
enacted, which prohibited, inter alia, discrimination by “any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance . . . .”10 Due to the limiting language of the Rehabilitation Act, the
then overseeing agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), prosecuted only unlawful disability
discrimination by air operators that were direct recipients of federal money.11 However, with the
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,12 the aforementioned section 404 was repealed,
the CAB was sunsetted, and disabled passengers were left without express statutory protections
against discriminatory acts by airlines.
Disabled passengers were dealt an even bigger blow when the United States Supreme
Court heard and ruled on U.S. Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.13
In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to apply section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to
commercial airlines by way of the benefits they receive as indirect recipients of federal funds
that are used to build and maintain airports, as well as to operate the national air traffic control
system.14 The Court, per Justice Powell, held that “. . . Congress has made it explicitly clear that
these funds are to go to airport operators. Not a single penny of the money is given to the
airlines. Thus, the recipient for purposes of section 504 is the operator of the airport and not its
7
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users.”15 The Court declared that federal protections under section 504 do not apply to airlines
because they do not “actually ‘receive’ federal financial assistance.”16 The holding in Paralyzed
Veterans left disabled travelers with no statutory protection against discrimination.17
B. The ACAA
The Air Carrier Access Act was enacted to overturn the holding in Paralyzed Veterans.
The ACAA passed through Congress with little resistance and became law on October 2, 1986
when it was signed by President Reagan.18 The ACAA19 provided the following statutory
protections to disabled travelers:
(c)(1) No air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified
handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air
transportation.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection the term “handicapped
individual” means any individual who has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an
impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.20
After a recodification in 1994 and an amendment in 2000 to apply its protections
to foreign carriers,21 the current version of the ACAA can be found at 49 U.S.C. § 41705.
Of the current provisions of the ACAA, the sections relevant to this paper are:
(a) In General.— In providing air transportation, an air carrier, including (subject
to section 40105 (b)) any foreign air carrier, may not discriminate against an
otherwise qualified individual on the following grounds:
(1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.
(2) the individual has a record of such an impairment.
(3) the individual is regarded as having such an impairment.
***
(c) Investigation of Complaints.—
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(1) In general.—The Secretary [of Transportation] shall investigate each
complaint of a violation of subsection (a).22
II.

PROTECTIONS UNDER THE ACAA

Generally, the initial issue in an ACAA case is whether an individual fits into the
category of an “otherwise qualified individual.” The ACAA’s use of the term “otherwise
qualified individual” 23 is very similar to the language of the ADA24 and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.25 While there has been some case law on the interpretation of the definition
of an “otherwise qualified individual” in terms of the ACAA, it is helpful to refer back to ADA
or Rehabilitation Act cases involving definitional interpretation.26
As required by the ACAA,27 the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated
rules to enforce the law.28 In order to be covered by the ACAA and meet the threshold test, a
passenger must: (1) be a qualified passenger with a disability as defined in 14 C.F.R. § 382.3; (2)
buy or otherwise validly obtain, or make a good faith effort to obtain, a ticket for air
transportation on a carrier and present himself or herself at the airport for the purpose of
traveling on the flight to which the ticket pertains; and (3) meet reasonable, nondiscriminatory
contract of carriage requirements applicable to all passengers.29
To be considered an “otherwise qualified individual,” a passenger must meet the
following definition: any individual who has a physical or mental impairment that, on a
permanent or temporary basis, substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record
of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.30 When courts have been
faced with the issue of whether a litigant is an “otherwise qualified individual,” they have
frequently looked to other sources of law, such as an ADA case or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission regulations.31
Assuming a passenger is entitled to ACAA protections, there are certain actions that an
airline may not take against a passenger with a disability. Some of these prohibited activities
include refusing to provide transportation on the basis of the passenger’s disability32; requiring
disabled individuals to notify airlines in advance of their travel intentions33; under most
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circumstances, requiring a qualified individual to travel with an attendant34; refusing
transportation or requiring a medical certificate on the basis of a communicable disease, unless
the disease poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others35; refusing service animals from
accompanying persons with disabilities in the cabin36; and requiring extra charges for providing
facilities, equipment, or services to a qualified passenger with a disability.37 Furthermore,
airlines are required to have a Complaint Resolution Officer (CRO) available at the airport to any
person who alleges violations of the ACAA.38
III.

REMEDIES FOR ACAA VIOLATIONS

Once an airline has been accused of violating the ACAA, the remedies available to the
individual are subject to much controversy. The existence of certain remedies and the
effectiveness of others for violations of the ACAA have been the source of most of the criticism
and litigation surrounding the Act. The two principal remedies that either exist or are alleged to
exist are: (1) administrative DOT enforcement action; and (2) lawsuits maintained under a
private right of action.
A. DOT Enforcement Action
The only statutory remedy expressly set forth in the text of the ACAA for suspected
violations is DOT enforcement action. This mandate comes from subsection (c) of the ACAA,
which states that “[t]he Secretary [of Transportation] shall investigate each complaint of a
violation of subsection (a).”39 In order to comply with this statutory requirement, the DOT
promulgated 14 C.F.R. § 382.159 which details the steps that an individual may take in order to
file a complaint for alleged disability discrimination. Passengers are given two options on how
to make a complaint to the DOT of suspected ACAA violations: (1) filling out an online report
on the website of the DOT’s Aviation Consumer Protection Division; or (2) writing directly to
the Department of Transportation, Aviation Consumer Protection Division.40
Once the DOT receives a complaint of discrimination, the agency follows detailed,
internal procedures as outlined in 14 C.F.R. § 302 et seq. to investigate the charge.41 If, after the
full adjudication process, the DOT discovers a violation of the ACAA, it is authorized to assess
civil penalties of up to $11,000 per violation.42 While these civil fines are authorized for ACAA
violations, the penalties are paid directly to the U.S. government.43 There is no provision that
allows the DOT to order an airline to make restitution to a passenger who has been the victim of
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discrimination and has suffered injury.44 Furthermore, the DOT’s discretionary powers to
decline to initiate enforcement proceedings are not judicially reviewable.45 The effect of the lack
of protections and the unavailability of individual remedies by means of DOT enforcement
proceedings will be detailed in Part VI.A, infra.
B. The Existence, or not, of a Private Right of Action under the ACAA
The greatest source of tension regarding a remedy under the ACAA is whether the law
allows for an implied private right of action which would permit a discriminated individual to
sue the airline directly for injuries that resulted from a violation of the Act. However, the only
way a private right of action could be maintained would be for a court to find an implied right,
since the plain language of the statute makes no provision for one. After early interpretations
found an implied private right of action, subsequent courts overturned those decisions. The most
current cases hold that there is no right to sue an airline directly for ACAA violations.
1. A Private Right of Action Exists
While most of the early cases that interpreted the ACAA held that a private right of
action exists, those decisions were based on Supreme Court precedent that has since been
overturned.46 The first case to be brought under the ACAA was Tallarico v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.47 In Tallarico, Polly, a 14-year-old girl with cerebral palsy, was not allowed to fly
unaccompanied during a trip to visit her family over a Thanksgiving holiday.48 The airline was
concerned about Polly’s ability to take care of herself in the event of an emergency and exit the
plane expeditiously,49 and required that someone accompany her on the flight.50, 51 Polly’s father
then flew to meet her and accompanied her on the flight at a cost of $1,350.52 Polly’s parents, on
their own and on behalf of their daughter, brought a lawsuit against TWA for violations of the
ACAA.53 The district court struck Mr. and Mrs. Tallarico’s individual claims in an unreported
decision.54 A jury verdict in the district court found for the Tallaricos on Polly’s claims alone,
and awarded damages in the amount of $80,000, covering both pecuniary losses and emotional
44
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distress.55 After a motion was granted remitting damages to out-of-pocket expenses ($1,350), the
Tallaricos appealed and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was given the first opportunity to
take up the issue of an implied right of action under the ACAA.56
The Court of Appeals, holding that the ACAA did imply a private right of action, relied
on a test that the Supreme Court had handed down in Cort v. Ash57 to determine the existence of
an implied private right of action in a statute.58 The Supreme Court, in Cort, outlined four
factors that are to be used to determine whether an implied right of action exists.59
Agreeing with the district court, the Eighth Circuit found that a private right of action did
exist. The holding in Tallarico, finding an implied private right of action, was followed in
subsequent cases in the Fifth Circuit,60 the Ninth Circuit,61 and two district courts, the Western
District of Tennessee62 and the District of New Jersey.63
After these early cases seem to have laid the issue to rest, the Supreme Court, in
Alexander v. Sandoval,64 clarified the test from Cort for determining the existence of an implied
right of action, leading several lower courts in subsequent decisions to hold that the ACAA does
not provide a private right of action, which is where the law stands today.
2. A Private Right of Action Does NOT Exist
The Court, in Alexander, redefined the Cort test and held that the four factors were not all
to be given equal weight and that the correct analysis is whether Congress intended to create a
private right of action.65 The other three factors were designed only to aid in the meaning of the
statute’s text.66 After the court’s holding in Alexander, federal appellate and district courts, in
several cases that followed, found no implied right of action under the ACAA.67 The first court
55
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to so hold was the Eleventh Circuit in Love v. Delta Air Lines.68 In Love, the court opined that
due to the extensive nature of enforcement proceedings the ACAA provides within the DOT,
Congress’s omission of a private right of action was purposeful and conspicuous.69 After the
holding in Love was announced, courts in the Tenth Circuit,70 Southern District of New York,71
and Eastern District of Missouri72 all followed suit, declining to find a private right of action in
the ACAA.73 Based upon the Supreme Court’s clarification of the Cort factors, the prevailing
notion within ACAA litigation is that the law does not confer a private right of action upon
discriminated passengers. This topic will be a source of discussion in Part VII.A, infra, in terms
of recommendations for changing and advancing the ACAA.
IV.

AIRLINES’ DEFENSES TO ACAA CLAIMS

When a passenger makes a claim of disability discrimination during travel against an
airline, that airline has several defenses it can raise. The sources of these defenses are statutory,
common law, and “self-help” measures.
A. Statutory “Safety” Defense
The first defense that an airline may assert to protect itself against an ACAA claim can
only be used in situations like hypothetical scenario B, supra, with Jack and his family; an airline
refusing to fly a passenger because of a concern involving the behavior of the passenger.
Airlines are given statutory protection74 to refuse transportation to a passenger on the basis of
safety. Section 44902 sets out situations where airlines are required to,75 and where they
permissively may,76 refuse transportation to passengers.77 In order to give airlines proper
guidance as to when they may rightfully deny transportation on the basis of safety, federal law
provides steps for airlines to take prior to making a determination that the passenger poses a
“direct threat.”78 A direct threat is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services.”79 The regulations require the airline to examine the
following to evaluate a direct threat: (i) the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (ii) the
assumingly found a private right of action under the ACAA, most commentators think of this case as an outlier. See
e.g., Strawinski, supra note 8.
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probability that the potential harm to the health and safety of others will actually occur; and (iii)
whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.80
However, even if an airline determines that a direct threat exists, it must choose the least
restrictive means of alleviating that danger from the point of view of the passenger.81 Refusal to
transport should be considered a last resort.82 Once an airline has invoked the “safety” provision
of federal law, it is required to provide a written statement to that effect to the passenger, which
must include several specific items.83
An airline would assert a safety defense in a situation where a disability might cause a
passenger to have uncontrollable violent episodes or be unable to remain calm during a flight. In
Jack’s situation, assuming arguendo that he has autism, his inability to sit still and remain calm
could pose a direct threat to the flight. The sensory overload that a child with autism could
experience onboard an aircraft could cause “meltdowns that involve crying, screaming or
kicking.”84 Airlines are more keen to simply remove the family from the aircraft if the child
cannot calm down instead of attempting other means to soothe the child.85 Such least restrictive
means could include giving the child a ten- or fifteen-minute rest in the terminal or reseating the
family to the rear of the aircraft to allow the child more space to calm down. Since removal from
the aircraft and refusal to transport is considered only as a last resort, the regulations provide
protections to the passengers to ensure that this drastic option is only used when all other
available solutions have been exhausted.
B. State Law Preemption
The second source of a defense for an airline arises in a situation where a passenger
brings a claim against the airline for tortuous conduct under state law. The Supreme Court, in
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,86 held that the preemption clause of the Airline
Deregulation Act87 preempted all state law claims regarding “rates, routes or services” of the
airlines.88 The decision in Morales concerned the state of Texas attempting to regulate airlines in
terms of price advertising.89 Following the Supreme Court’s holding, a district court applied that
decision to state law claims brought by a disabled passenger for false imprisonment, holding that
the claims were preempted.90 There, the district court held that Morales “leaves little doubt that
a claim based on common law tort or contract is subject to . . . pre-emption . . . if it can be
demonstrated that it ‘relates to’ airline ‘rates, routes, or services.’ ”91
However, in 1995 the Supreme Court heard American Airlines v. Wolens92 to decide a
preemption issue regarding the altering of an airline’s contract with its passengers in connection
80
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with its frequent flier program. In Wolens, the Supreme Court ruled that the Airline
Deregulation Act did not preempt state law claims in actions to enforce private contract rights.93
Since the ACAA contains no preemption clause regarding state claims, a court will usually look
to both Morales and Wolens to determine if the ACAA, by way of the preemption clause of the
Airline Deregulation Act, preempts the specific state law claims at bar.94
Finally, in a case decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1999, that court held that the preemption
clause of the Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt state law claims based upon disability
discrimination.95 The court came to this conclusion by holding that “[a]s used in a public utility
sense, the term “service” does not refer to alleged discrimination to passengers due to their
disabilities.”96
Because courts dealing with preemption issues have generally declined to adopt a general
rule regarding which types of claims will be subject to preemption, it seems likely that most
preemption issues will be handled on a case-by-case basis by the courts.97
C. Preemption under the Montreal Convention
A third source of a useable defense for an airline addresses claims of injuries arising from
international travel. When a passenger brings a claim of injuries resulting from disability
discrimination, the airline can assert a defense that the claim is preempted by the Montreal
Convention.98 The Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy against an air carrier for
any injury or death of a passenger during a flight between countries that are parties to the
Convention.99 Therefore, the Montreal Convention can be the only source of a remedy for
injuries that occur during international travel.
The Montreal Convention, of course, only applies to international carriers if that airline’s
country is a party to the treaty.100 However, in 2000 the ACAA was amended to apply to foreign
carriers101 subject to 49 USC § 40105(b).102 The “subject to” clause in the ACAA refers back to
language in section 40105 which states “[i]n carrying out this part, the Secretary of
Transportation and the [FAA] Administrator shall act consistently with obligations of the United
States Government under an international agreement.”103 This provision of federal law subjects
the ACAA to international agreements, such as the Montreal Convention.
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One of the early cases that dealt with an issue of Montreal Convention preemption after
the 2000 amendment to the ACAA was Turturro v. Continental Airlines.104 In Turturro, the
district court stated that “[t]he [ACAA] amendment’s legislative history notes that the change
‘extends the existing prohibition on discrimination to foreign airlines operating to the United
States subject to bilateral obligations under § 40105(b).’ ”105 That court concluded by saying
“. . . Congress, in extending protection to travelers on foreign carriers, manifestly did not intend
to rescind components of a crucial and longstanding treaty.”106
Therefore, since it seems that the ACAA’s extension to cover foreign carriers is
preempted by the Montreal Convention, it is difficult to tell what, if any, effect the ACAA’s
foreign airline provision really has.107 What is clear, though, is that the Montreal Convention can
be used by airlines as a defense to private claims brought under the ACAA involving
international flights.108
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With all that being said, it seems clear that the ACAA’s protections must give way to the international
nature of air transportation and that international agreements need to be implemented to ensure that foreign airlines
are aware of their legal responsibilities during flights.
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D. Self-Help Remedy for the Airline
The final tool that an airline could use has no legal standing, but has practical use: direct
compensation to passengers. An airline is free to directly compensate a passenger who makes a
claim against it for violation of the ACAA. This compensation generally is offered by a
supervisor at the airport as an attempt to remedy the situation and keep it from escalating further.
As a former station manager for a major airline at Washington Dulles International Airport
concluded, most people who make a charge are simply looking for some sort of compensation.109
The manager explained that if a situation arose which could have been the basis of an ACAA
claim against the airline, it seemed simple enough to provide the passenger with some form of
compensation at the airport, be it a flight credit or a voucher.110 The passenger might then see
the situation as nothing more than an inconvenience, accept the compensation from the airline,
and write the whole matter off as a bad travel experience.111
It should be noted that this form of a “defense,” much akin to simply buying the
passenger off, in no way insulates an airline from subsequent penalties if the passenger chooses
to file an ACAA claim, and such voluntary compensation is not considered a “settlement.” The
DOT does, however, ask passengers who file complaints if they attempted “efforts to resolve the
complaint through the airline’s Complaint Resolution Official (CRO) or other airline staff.”112 It
would be at this point where the passenger would inform the DOT of any compensation received
from the airline; however, the fact that a passenger received compensation from the airline does
not foreclose DOT enforcement action.113
V.

THE ACAA’S IMPACT ON FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN WITH DISABILITES

The impact that flying has on a family is difficult enough. Airports are one of the least
child-friendly places around. A family traveling with a child who has a disability has many more
obstacles that must be overcome in order to keep air travel as the most efficient means of
transportation. When the ACAA was enacted, it was designed to protect the disabled traveler,
but there are no special provisions aimed at protecting a disabled child. While parents of
children who have disabilities can be strong advocates for their children, it doesn’t take much for
a family to become overwhelmed by the arduous process of flying with their disabled child.
An example of the difficulties that families with children who have disabilities face when
flying was disclosed in a conversation with Mrs. Jordan Richards. Mrs. Richards and husband
John Richards have a 10-year-old boy, T.R., who has multiple disabilities resulting from
tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC). TSC is a degenerative genetic disorder that causes tumors to
form in different organs in the body; for T.R., the tumors formed in his brain.114 TSC affects one
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in 60,000 births in the U.S.115 TSC manifests itself in T.R. by producing severe mental
retardation, autism, and seizures.116 While T.R. is 10 years old, he has the cognitive functioning
level of an 18-month-old child but weighs approximately 145 pounds.117
Mrs. Richards explained that her son is prone to random seizures which must be dealt
with immediately. Given the unknown and sporadic nature of the seizures, travel with T.R. is
very difficult. Mrs. Richards discussed that her family has flown a few times, but when given
the option, will often pick driving over flying. Driving gives T.R. the space and comfort that air
travel cannot afford him. Mrs. Richards mentioned that her family would much rather fly than
travel by car, but she is concerned regarding the difficulties that flying with T.R. would produce,
given his size and severe disabilities. Furthermore, Mrs. Richards questions the amount of
support that an airline could provide T.R. in the event that he experiences a seizure mid-flight or
develops other issues requiring prompt attention or medical care.
Mrs. Richards talked about the times when her family has flown on commercial airlines.
She explained that while she hasn’t run into a situation where she felt the airline discriminated
against her or her family, other passengers have made harsh comments about T.R., which has
made the flying experience less than satisfactory.
Mrs. Richards and her husband are activists in the fight to find a cure for TSC and are
very involved with advocacy groups which share her goal. Mrs. Richards explained that she is
familiar with anti-discrimination laws regarding disabilities because Mr. Richards is a lawyer
with a prominent law firm in Washington, D.C., but she was unaware of the specific law that
covers air travel discrimination.
After speaking with Mrs. Richards, one sentiment seemed paramount: families know the
hassle that flying can be. They also are aware of the exacerbated complexities that flying with
their disabled children creates. Some families might also be more willing to forego the speed of
air transportation in favor of ground transportation when travel is required. Especially with a
family like the Richards, who have an extremely high-need disabled child, the freedom of being
able to change plans and make unscheduled stops to deal with T.R. as they travel is invaluable.
In addition to the plight of the Richards family, the hypothetical situations that this paper
has posed for Jack and his family are anything but hypothetical. These are real-life scenarios
often faced by families with children who have disabilities.118
The very issue that the court dealt with in Tallarico is the situation that Jack would have
to endure in hypothetical A, being required by the airlines to fly with a safety attendant. As
noted, when the holding in Tallarico was issued, the DOT had not yet promulgated its
corresponding federal regulations. Now, however, the action by the airline of requiring a safety
attendant is expressly forbidden by 14 C.F.R. § 382.29. An airline nevertheless may require Jack
to be accompanied by a safety attendant if it can show that Jack meets one of four outlined
requirements.119 As a protection for the disabled traveler, if Jack believes, through self-
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assessment (or though the assessment of his parents), that he can fly alone and the airline insists
on an escort, the airline cannot charge a fare for the safety attendant’s seat on the aircraft.120
While the ACAA provides protections for the disabled passenger in the family, there is
no protection for the other injured family members if the child is subjected to discrimination.
This is one of the ACAA’s deficiencies, and is particularly harmful to families of disabled
children, as detailed, infra, in Part VI.B.
VI.

DEFICIENCIES OF THE ACAA

As noted throughout this paper, the ACAA is a well-intentioned law aimed at providing
statutory protections to disabled travelers where none previously existed. However, the law has
several deficiencies which cause it to be less than effective at its anticipated purpose. These
deficiencies will be described herein, and suggestions will be made on how to correct them.
A. The Failure to Provide a Private Right of Action
The biggest shortcoming in the ACAA is the inability of the discriminated passenger to
sue the airline directly for its discriminatory actions. Even though the early cases interpreting the
ACAA found an implied private right of action,121 the later cases have turned away from those
holdings, with courts now finding that the ACAA does not imply a private right of action.122
This leaves the disabled passenger without a remedy, save for DOT enforcement action
prescribed expressly by the ACAA.123 While the DOT can investigate claims of ACAA
discrimination, there is no mandate that the DOT actually prosecute every claim.124
Furthermore, while federal law prescribes civil penalties for violations of the ACAA, all
penalties are paid to the U.S. government.125 There are no provisions of federal law allowing the
DOT to require the airline to pay restitution to the injured passenger.126 Without a private right
of action, the disabled passenger has no means to recover damages for injuries sustained when an
airline discriminates on the basis of disability.
B. The Lack of an Association Claim
The Air Carrier Access Act lacks an association clause similar to that found in the
ADA.127 The association claim under the ADA allows a person to bring a disability
discrimination suit because an employer discriminated against a non-disabled person “because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association.”128 The effect of this omission is far-reaching; the absence of an
association claim means the disabled passenger may bring an action only for his or her own
injuries and not for the injuries129 of the family that was flying with the disabled passenger. This
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omission is problematic because of the unique nature of air transportation. Disabled passengers
(for purposes of this article, disabled children) often fly with their families. If an act of
discrimination occurs and the entire family is injured resulting in financial losses, only the
disabled child could assert a disability discrimination claim. The family, however, could bring a
private suit alleging breaches of the airline’s contract of carriage (if a violation so occurred) or
violations of other common law doctrines, but statutory protections for discrimination based
upon the family’s association with their disabled child would not be allowed under the ACAA.
C. The Interplay of the Montreal Convention and the ACAA
Another major deficiency in the ACAA is the interplay it has with the Montreal
Convention. As discussed in Part IV.C, airlines involved in international air transportation into
or out of the U.S. are apparently insulated from ACAA requirements during the course of the
flight, up to and including disembarkation. To give an example of how far-reaching this
deficiency in the ACAA could be, at Washington Dulles International Airport, the major airport
for international travel into the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, from October 2008 to
September 2009, air carriers transported approximately 6.2 million passengers in international
travel.130 Therefore, the Montreal Convention would be a direct bar to disability discrimination
claims by these 6.2 million passengers.131
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

The ACAA needs changes; not minor, technical changes but broad and far-reaching
changes. The proposals that follow are designed to bring the ACAA back to its original purpose,
the effective protection of disabled travelers who partake in transportation by air.
A. A Private Right of Action
It hardly needs to be recapitulated that the biggest change needed for the ACAA is the
inclusion of a private right of action. While DOT enforcement proceedings are successful at
assessing civil fines against violating airlines, they are unable to fully protect the rights of the
disabled flying public and to compensate them when pecuniary losses occur from discrimination.
Disability advocacy groups have called for an amendment to the ACAA to include a private right
of action.132 Congress thus far has failed to act. However, Congress made a step in the right
direction in 2004 when Senator Kennedy introduced a bill that included a provision which would
have amended the ACAA to include a private right of action.133 The bill, however, died in
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committee and there hasn’t been a move since to amend the ACAA to include a private right of
action.
Without a doubt, the ACAA must be amended to provide a private right of action if the
law is to fulfill its intent to protect travelers. As it stands, the ACAA falls short of its promise.
B. An Association Clause
To complement the private right of action, the ACAA should include an association
clause with language modeled on the association clause of the ADA. Due to the unique nature of
air travel, seldom does a child with a disability fly alone (though it’s already been conclusively
shown that such children are permitted to fly unaccompanied). An airline that discriminates
against an entire family because of the disability of the child is not liable for any damages to the
family under disability laws. Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act apply to most
segments of air travel, leaving the ACAA as the only source of remedy for disability
discrimination. The absence of an association clause leaves Jack’s family in hypothetical B with
no remedy beyond claims for violations of the airline’s contract of carriage. Jack would have an
ACAA claim, but his family would not. Therefore, if Jack would be denied service, his family
would then voluntarily leave the aircraft, providing a potential defense to the airline if his family
members bring suit for their own damages. To avoid this unjust situation, the ACAA needs to
have an association clause which allows for a private right of action for those who are
discriminated against because of their association with a disabled person.
C. The ACAA Needs to be Reconciled with the Montreal Convention
As detailed in Part IV.C and footnote 108, there is a disconnect between the ACAA’s
applicability to international travel and the Montreal Convention. Too many international
passengers are unprotected when their injuries don’t fall into the Convention’s definition of a
cognizable claim and their “local law” claims are preempted by the very treaty that failed to
protect them. If this area of the law can be reconciled, international travelers can be protected by
anti-discrimination laws that protect their domestic traveling counterparts.
D. Education about the ACAA and the Nature of Disabilities Needs to be Increased
The ancient legal doctrine ignorantia juris non excusat, “ignorance of the law does not
excuse,” must stand true for airline employees. During the course of conducting research for this
paper, the author found a lack of understanding by airline personnel in terms of the general
nature of disabilities. All too often, situations involving the disabled while flying are escalated
simply because airline personnel don’t understand or take the time to fully grasp the situation.
When a situation arises, airline personnel may be more concerned with their on-time departure
rating than ensuring compliance with federal law in this area. This is exactly what happened in
2009 for two-year-old Jarret Farrell and his mother when the autistic child had a “meltdown” on
a flight, prior to its takeoff, and the family subsequently was removed from the flight.134 Instead
of trying to find a more reasonable way of calming down this over-sensitized child (such as
giving him some water, reseating him in an area with more space, or giving him an opportunity
to “cry it out” in the terminal), the airline immediately jumped to the ultimate penalty, refusal to
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transport.135 If airline personnel are better trained on how to handle situations involving the most
common disabilities, incidents like the one involving Jarret would become less frequent.
While federal regulations require airlines to provide specific training to personnel on the
ACAA and its associated regulations,136 additional education should include the nature of the
most common disabilities that airline personnel see in the traveling public. This education will
benefit both the airline and the public. The airline benefits because increased training would
give personnel a better insight into disabilities, possibly making a positive change in the way
airlines handle situations. In addition to providing disabled passengers with the increased level
of service that they need and deserve (because air travel is still a service industry, after all), the
increased education can help protect the airline from subsequent ACAA or other discrimination
charges arising from alleged deleterious conduct. This pedagogical approach, in addition to the
“legal requirement” approach, can only serve the interests of all parties and make flying for a
passenger with a disability less stressful.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Transportation by air is one of the most common forms of moving people and goods from
place to place in the U.S. Because the aviation industry often dips its “wings” into many
different areas of the law and commerce, this mode of transportation remains one of the most
fiercely regulated, with at least three major cabinet-level federal agencies137 having to deal with
some aspect of the day-to-day operation and/or regulation of the country’s aviation network. It
shouldn’t seem odd that the world of aviation has its own rules regarding disability
discrimination. When Paralyzed Veterans was announced, the ACAA became law within a
matter of months. This well-intentioned law provides protections to disabled travelers to ensure
they are treated equally and fairly when they fly. The ACAA’s associated regulations put firm
requirements on airlines to ensure their compliance with this part of federal law.
The ACAA, like most laws, is not perfect. It contains shortcomings and deficiencies,
such as the lack of both a private right of action and an association clause. Also, because of air
transportation’s interplay with international law, the ACAA has been forced to take a back seat
to long-standing international treaties. This weakens the protections the ACAA intended to
afford to those travelers who need them most. Finally, the ACAA has a profound impact on the
way families with children with disabilities fly, or even choose not to. While the ACAA is a
good law, with good intentions, Congress needs to sit down with advocacy groups and airline
representatives to amend this law and make it more uniformly applicable and practical.
No one wants to see incidents like the one with Jarret Farrell and his mother. With
improved ACAA protections, increased education of airline personnel, and increased awareness
by the traveling public, disabled children and their families won’t be wrongfully turned away
from experiencing one of the most awesome and breathtaking means of traveling; because, after
all, travel is all about the journey.
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